Reviews/Endorsements:
“A fascinating monograph that questions long-held assumptions about the State Department’s and CIA’s ability to influence the course of events.” -- The Historian, Volume 72, Number 1
“A study worthy of consideration.” -- Hispanic American Historical Review, August 2009
"Kristian Gustafson has produced a well-documented analytical study that argues persuasively that the real hostility toward Chile originated in the Nixon White House and that the CIA, far from being omnipotent was often a mere instrument of White House directives that frequently ignored intelligence in favor of ill-conceived solutions." -- H-War, H-Net Reviews, December 2008
"Thoroughly researched and clearly written, Gustafson's book provides a balanced assessment of intelligence community actions in Chile that will be valuable to students, scholars, and policy elites." -- Choice, August 2008
“….provocative….makes good use of newly declassified U.S. government documents, fresh interviews, and Chilean accounts.” -- Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008
“Gustafson demolishes some of the most enduring myths and exaggerations about the CIA and Allende’s Chile. This is a thoroughly researched and argued account, using newly declassified records and interviews, of how the CIA impacted Chile during the most explosive years of its modern history. The author is prudent, balanced, and astute and his account is gracefully written.
-- Brian Latell, Senior Research Associate at the University of Miami and former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
“Gustafson’s thoughtful book challenges many of the simple orthodoxies about American intervention in Chile. He shows that assumptions of American responsibility for the 11 September 1973 coup are overstated. He similarly undermines claims about American Realpolitik in the region. Gustafson persuasively argues that U.S. policy-makers perceived a serious communist threat in Chile, but their reactions were mixed, uncertain, and ultimately counterproductive. American covert activities in Chile failed because they did not match basic American aims and capabilities in the region. This is a provocative assessment with enormous implications for the ways we think about covert action in the Middle East and other parts of the world today.”
-- Jeremi Suri, author of Henry Kissinger and the American Century
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